Yahya Hassas Yeganeh; Saber Sheri; H. Khosrownejad
Volume 6, Issue 24 , January 2009, , Pages 79-115
Abstract
In order to solve the distrust problem of the moral hazard in information asymmetry issue in capital markets, corporate governance is introduced. This is an assumption that corporate governance results to a healthful life for organizations in a long horizon and protects the stockholders interests. International ...
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In order to solve the distrust problem of the moral hazard in information asymmetry issue in capital markets, corporate governance is introduced. This is an assumption that corporate governance results to a healthful life for organizations in a long horizon and protects the stockholders interests. International organizations and institutes, suggest the governance codes as a tool to develop the competition ability of corporate to access to the international capital sources, and it also affects economic and employment improvements.
This research studied some of the corporate governance mechanisms in TSE and examines the probable correlation between earning management and corporate governance mechanisms, debt ratio and firm size. The current study employs the cross-sectional modified version of Jones, where abnormal working capital accruals are used as proxy for earnings management. The study reveals that corporate governance mechanisms (board size, proportion of independent directors, competence of independent directors, separation of the roles of CEO and chairman, CEO membership, ownership structure and existence of audit dept.) have non-significant relation with earning management. It also shows that debt ratio and firm size have no significant relation with earning management.
